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Journal #J-02/1999
Incentives for sustainable land management in
peasant agriculture in the Ethiopian highlands
Stein Holden & Bekele Shiferaw
Department of Economics & Reesource Management
Agricultural University of Norway
PO Box 5033, N-1432 Ås, Norway
http://www.nlh.no/ior/
e-mail: stein.holden@ior.nlh.no    

Holden, S.T. & B. Shiferaw (1999): "Incentives for sustainable land management in peasant agriculture in the Ethiopian highlands", pp. 275-294 in Saunders, D.W, P.C. Huszar, S. Sombatpanit & T. Enters (eds.), Incentives in Soil Conservation. From Theory to Practice, Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, India.

Abstract: The Ethiopian highlands represent one of the most productive parts of the African continent, but have suffered from extensive resource degradation. Since the mid 1970s, attempts have been made to reverse the situation through soil and water conservation programs in some areas. Peasants' internal incentives to maintain externally introduced conservation structures or to undertake such investments on their own initiative have been disappointing. This chapter advances and tests several hypotheses to explain peasants' incentives to invest in more sustainable land management. It offers an analysis of peasants' responses to various policy instruments for soil and water conservation. Poverty - caused by civil war, pervasive market imperfections and policy failures - tends to increase peasants' discount rates and lower their ability and willingness to pay for conservation. The vicious poverty-environment spiral makes a strong case for public intervention to increase peasants' incentives for land conservation. Various policy instruments that may be used for this purpose are outlined. Local participation is considered crucial in planning, implementation, monitoring and enforcement. Interlinkage mechanisms, such as food-for-work or credit and fertilizer supply linked to conservation, may be used. Other instruments may include generation and dissemination of conservation technologies that offer short-term benefits, provision of secure land rights and removal of policy distortions that encourage unsustainable resource use. Input subsidies (cost sharing) may in some cases be justified, particularly if they can be directly linked to conservation activities

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Institutt for økonomi og ressursforvaltning
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