Journal #J-17/2003
Perceptual Intimacy and Conceptual Inadequacy: A Husserlian Critique of McDowell's Internalism
Frode Kjosavik
Department of Economics & Social Sciences Agricultural University of Norway PO Box 5033, N-1432 Ås, Norway http://www.nlh.no/ior/ e-mail: frode.kjosavik@ior.nlh.no

Kjosavik, F. (2003): "Perceptual Intimacy and Conceptual Inadequacy: A Husserlian Critique of McDowell's Internalism", pp. 49-71 in Zahavi, D. (et al., eds.): Metaphysics, Facticity, Interpretation, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, the Netherlands.

Abstract:
The tension between coherentism and the so-called Myth of the Given is addressed, starting out from how this has been phrased recently by McDowell, and then turning to Husserl for a critical perspective. It is argued that they both hold an internalist og first person position with regard to justification of perceptual beliefs. However, whereas McDowell claims that sense experience is conceptual throughout, Kjosavik argues that it also has non-conceptual content in the form of a perceptual surplus. Husserl's notion of fulfilment and frustration of intentions is then brought in to account for how such a perceptual surplus can still put a rational constraint on our beliefs.

Key words: Husserl, McDowell, internalism, justification, non-conceptual content

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