Journal #J-11/2001
Environmental resources, property regimes and efficiency
Arild Vatn
Department of Economics & Social Sciences Agricultural University of Norway PO Box 5033, N-1432 Ås, Norway http://www.nlh.no/ior/ e-mail: arild.vatn@ior.nlh.no

Vatn, A. (2001): "Environmental resources, property regimes and efficiency", Government and Policy, 19(5):681-693.

Abstract:
Why are certain property regimes preferred? They cannot be chosen on the basis of efficiency considerations alone since what is efficient depends on the institutional structures themselves and the interests they are set to defend. The paper starts by highlighting some important distinctions between various property regimes. While categories like private, common and state property all may imply some degree of co-ownership and be overlapping along some dimensions, the logic of each system, ideally defined, may be quite distinct. The paper shows that there is nothing inherent in a resource that demands a certain regime. Property regimes are social constructs and have to be defended by judgement, not by necessity. The paper demonstrates that the main role of property regimes is to defend certain interests. Furthermore, they seem to influence which interests are formed or get activated. The preferences from which to make efficiency evaluations are thus dependent upon the chosen system. This way technically oriented evaluations like cost-benefit analysis are caught in severe circularities. The implication of this for policy is that evaluating regimes implies taking a stand concerning what we want to become both as individuals and as a society.

Key words: Property regimes, co-ownership, community identification, cost shifting, efficiency, natural resources

To order: fax (+47) 6494 3012 or e-mail: ior@ior.nlh.no