Journal #J-04/2001
Playing Games in the Forest: State - Local Conflicts of Land Appropriation
Arild Angelsen
Department of Economics & Social Sciences Agricultural University of Norway PO Box 5033, N-1432 Ås, Norway http://www.nlh.no/ior/ e-mail: arild.angelsen@ior.nlh.no

Angelsen, A. (2001): "Playing Games in the Forest: State - Local Conflicts of Land Appropriation", Land Economics, 77(2):285-299.

Abstract:
This paper explores possible strategic interactions between the state and local community in games of tropical forestland appropriation. Two key questions are addressed. First, how does the structure of the game influence the extent of deforestation? Second, under which circumstances does higher forest appropriation by the state promote local deforestation? Three different cases are discussed, corresponding to a development over time towards increased forestland competition and integration of the local community into the national economy. Particular attention is given to the assumptions made about local markets and the local costs of state deforestation. The local response to more state appropriation depends critically on these assumptions, and less on the structure of the game (Cournot or Stackelberg). The state will fuel local deforestation if state deforestation is associated with provision of infrastructure (roads) which reduces the local costs of agricultural expansion, or when markets are imperfect and local behaviour determined by survival needs rather than income maximization. The model is also used to illustrate the potential and problems of cooperation in forest management and conservation.

Key words: Deforestation, forest management, agriculture, land conflicts, game theory.

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