TY  - GEN
UR  - https://orgprints.org/id/eprint/15875/
SP  - 145
Y1  - 2009///
KW  - Collective action; Generalized social trust; Pro-environmental behavior; organic food consumption; recycling
AV  - restricted
EP  - 160
N2  - Does generalized social trust help solve large-N collective action problems? This paper argues so, offering a novel explanation for the relationship: People tend to cooperate if they expect others to be cooperating, which implies that people holding generalized social trust more readily cooperate in large-N dilemmas because they expect that most people will cooperate. The paper tests the explanation in a rigorous design. The analyses show a positive, robust effect of generalized social trust on public good provision, but no effect is found in a joint product situation. This supports the hypothesis, indicating that trust specifically enhances cooperation in collective action dilemmas.
A1  - Sønderskov, Kim Mannemar
ID  - orgprints15875
TI  - Different goods, different effects: exploring the effects of generalized social trust in large-N collective action
ER  -