Journal #J-12/2003
Team Approaches in Reducing Nonpoint Source Pollution
Eirik Romstad
Department of Economics & Social Sciences Agricultural University of Norway PO Box 5033, N-1432 Ås, Norway http://www.nlh.no/ior/ e-mail: eirik.romstad@ior.nlh.no

Romstad, E. (2003): "Team Approaches in Reducing Nonpoint Source Pollution", Ecological Economics, 47(1):71-78.

Abstract:
It is technically difficult and costly to monitor nonpoint source pollution. Consequently, most economic instruments directed towards reducing this type of pollution have focused on circumventing the monitoring problem by focusing on readily observable factors. Such instruments include taxes or tradable permits on inputs or other incentives to induce changes in farming practices.

One difficulty with such approaches is that the incentives may not be consistent with the primary objectives of the policies??to reduce nutrient runoffs. This paper seeks to identify under what conditions it would be beneficial to apply more direct incentives for reduced nutrient runoffs. Monitoring and enforcement are core issues in this connection. It is still difficult to monitor individual farm field runoffs. Hence, the incentive problems associated with multiple agents emitting to the same recipient need to be resolved.

Key words: Nonpoint source pollution; Game theory; Environmental economics; Incentives; Enforcement and monitoring

Full text: ScientsDirect

To order: fax (+47) 6494 3012 or e-mail: ior@ior.nlh.no