Sønderskov, Kim Mannemar (2009) Different goods, different effects: exploring the effects of generalized social trust in large-N collective action. Public Choice, 140 (1), pp. 145-160.
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Online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9416-0
Does generalized social trust help solve large-N collective action problems? This paper argues so, offering a novel explanation for the relationship: People tend to cooperate if they expect others to be cooperating, which implies that people holding generalized social trust more readily cooperate in large-N dilemmas because they expect that most people will cooperate. The paper tests the explanation in a rigorous design. The analyses show a positive, robust effect of generalized social trust on public good provision, but no effect is found in a joint product situation. This supports the hypothesis, indicating that trust specifically enhances cooperation in collective action dilemmas.
|EPrint Type:||Journal paper|
|Keywords:||Collective action; Generalized social trust; Pro-environmental behavior; organic food consumption; recycling|
|Subjects:||"Organics" in general|
Knowledge management > Research methodology and philosophy > Specific methods > Surveys and statistics
Values, standards and certification > Consumer issues
|Research affiliation:||Denmark > DARCOF III (2005-2010) > COP - Public policies and demand for organic food|
|Deposited By:||Sønderskov, Kim Mannemar|
|Deposited On:||12 Aug 2009|
|Last Modified:||12 Apr 2010 07:39|
|Refereed:||Peer-reviewed and accepted|
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